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The Employment-at-Will Rule:
The Development of Exceptions and Pennsylvania's
Response
I. INTRODUCTION
A major controversy in employer-employee relationships is brew-
ing in the United States as a result of one silent majority's will to
be heard. This silent majority consists of those workers, both blue
and white collar, who have been burdened with the nomenclature
"employee-at-will." The "employment-at-will" rule, sometimes re-
ferred to as the American rule,' provides that employment rela-
tionships of an indefinite duration may be terminated by either
party at any time with or without notice, "for good cause, for no
cause or even for cause morally wrong . . . . Further, the rule
operates despite the number of years of service an employee has
rendered.3
Although the employment-at-will rule has been a part of the em-
ployment relationship in America for over a century and was at
one time recognized as a right guaranteed under the Constitution, 4
changing times, criticism, 5 and the persistence of discharged em-
ployees have led to the development of exceptions to this rule. To-
day, some employees are shielded from unjust dismissal by the
terms of a collective bargaining agreement, e by certain federal and/
1. See DeGiuseppe, The Effect of the Employment-at-Will Rule on Employee Rights
to Job Security and Fringe Benefits, 10 FORDHAM UaB. L. Rv. 1, 6 (1981).
2. Payne v. Western & At. R.R., 81 Tenn. 507, 519-20 (1884).
3. Pearson v. Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 332 F.2d 439 (7th Cir. 1964) (no enforce-
able claim despite the fact that employee's ability to obtain other employment was limited
by his long service to defendant); Hoblas v. Armour and Co., 270 F.2d 71 (8th Cir. 1959)(em-
ployee discharged without cause after 45 years of satisfactory service despite the fact that he
was within one year of retirement).
4. Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908).
5. See, e.g., Blades, Employment at Will vs. Individual Freedom: On Limiting the
Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1404 (1967); DeGiuseppe, supra
note 1; Feinman, The Development of the Employment at Will Rule, 20 AM. J. LEGAL HIST.
118 (1976); Peck, Unjust Discharges From Employment: A Necessary Change in the Law,
40 OHIo ST. L.J. 1 (1979); Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26 STAN. L. Rav.
335 (1974).
6. The right to collective bargaining is secured by § 7 of the National Labor Relations
Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980). Approximately 80% of the collective
bargaining agreements in the United States provide that employees cannot be discharged
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or state statutes which prohibit various forms of discrimination
and/or retaliation, and more recently by certain court fashioned
exceptions based on public policy considerations,8 and/or upon the
implied contractual right of good faith.'
Recently, Pennsylvania courts have also tread onto the hereto-
fore unchartered grounds of wrongful discharge. Their steps have
been slow and careful, and have appeared at times to be overly
cautious.10 Possibly in an attempt to spur the courts of this Com-
monwealth on or to remove the issue from them entirely, Pennsyl-
vania State Representative James Manderino proposed House Bill
1742, entitled the "Unjust Dismissal Act."11 This act was designed
to open wide the doors previously closed to employees-at-will in
this state, and to subject employers in the Commonwealth to scru-
tiny each time they dismissed an employee.
12
This comment will trace the history of the employment-at-will
rule and discuss the growth of judicial exceptions, placing particu-
lar emphasis on Pennsylvania law, both common and statutory. It
will also offer support in favor of a more lenient view of the public
policy exception that will protect the employee-at-will from unjust
dismissal, and protect the employer's normal right to discharge by
establishing guidelines which will enable both the employer and
employee to determine when a dismissal will be considered
actionable.
II. HISTORY
Under common law, a contract for employment which specified
its duration was simply enforced according to the will of the par-
ties and continuation of work after the expiration of the first term
without "cause" or only for "just cause." 2 COLLECTIVE BARGAINING, NEGOTIATIONS & CON-
TRACTS (BNA) 40:1 (Dec. 28, 1978). Even if not explicitly provided for in a collective bar-
gaining agreement, arbitrators invariably read such a term into the agreement. Summers,
Individual Protections Against Unjust Dismissal: Time for a Statute, 62 VA. L. REV. 481,
499-500 (1976).
7. See infra notes 47-54 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 74-97 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 63-73 and accompanying text.
10. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (although
recognizing that exceptions to the at-will rule can be founded upon public policy, the court
refused a cause of action to plaintiff who was discharged for reporting a dangerous flaw in
his employer's product to his employer. The court claimed that public safety was an insuffi-
cient basis upon which to recognize a cause of action).
11. H.B. 1742, 165th Pa. Gen. Assem., (1981 Sess.).
12. Id. § 2.
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was normally construed as a renewal for an identical period.'3 In
England, however, in the absence of a specified duration, a con-
tract for employment was presumed to be a hiring for one year
subject to renewal for each successive year of employment,1 4 and
under certain conditions terminable only for "reasonable cause"
and with notice.' 5 This is where American and English law parted
ways.'"
By the latter part of the 19th century three major trends were
evident in the American law of employer-employee relationships.
7
The one which became the proverbial thorn in the side of the em-
ployee and which offers the most opposition to plaintiffs is wrong-
ful discharge cases was promulgated by Horace Gray Wood, a nine-
teenth century lawyer/commentator who wrote a treatise in 1877
on the American law of master and servant relationships. In his
treatise, Wood emphatically stated that:
[In America] the rule is inflexible that a general or indefinite hiring is prima
facie a hiring at will, and if the servant seeks to make it out a yearly hiring,
the burden is upon him to establish it by proof. A hiring at so much a day,
week, month, or year, no time being specified, is an indefinite hiring, and no
presumption attaches that it was for a day even, but only at the rate fixed
13. Fawcett v. Cash, 110 Eng. Rep. 1026 (K.B. 1834); Egbert v. Sun Co., 126 F. 568
(E.D. Pa. 1903); Jones v. Graham & Morton Transp. Co., 51 Mich. 539, 16 N.W. 893 (1883).
14. See McCullough Iron Co. v. Carpenter, 67 Md. 554, 11 A. 176 (1887); Adams v.
Fitzpatrick, 125 N.Y. 124, 26 N.E. 143 (1891); Beeston v. Collyer, 130 Eng. Rep. 786 (C.P.
1827); See Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469, 470 (1921).
15. DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 4; Summers, supra note 6, at 485.
16. Note, Employment Contracts of Unspecified Duration, 42 COLUM. L. REV. 107,
107-08 (1942); DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 5-7; Note, supra note 5, at 341.
17. One approach, and the one which best suits the handling of wrongful discharge
cases, analyzed the circumstances surrounding the employment situation to determine what
type of contract might reasonably be inferred. The second created a presumption that a
hiring continues for a period identical to the pay interval. The third was Wood's employ-
ment-at-will rule. See Note, supra note 5, at 341 n. 50 and accompanying text.
Many courts have used the first approach, circumstances surrounding the employment
situation, to allow a cause of action for wrongful discharge if the employee rendered addi-
tional consideration, such as moving a great distance or selling one's business to their em-
ployer, if the discharge was without cause. See, e.g., Littell v. Evening Star Newspaper Co.,
120 F.2d 36 (D.C. Cin. 1941); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64 F.R.D. 561 (D. N.H. 1974);
Foster Wheeler Corp. v. Zell, 250 Ala. 146, 33 So. 2d, 255 (1948); Rabago-Alverez v. Dart
Indus., 55 Cal. App. 3d 91, 127 Cal. Rptr. 222 (1976); Chatelier v. Robertson, 118 So. 2d 241
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1960); Griffith v. Sollay Foundation Drilling, Inc., 373 So. 2d 979 (La.
1979); Bussard v. College of St. Thomas, Inc., 294 Minn. 215, 200 N.W.2d 155 (1972); Weid-
man v. United Cigar Stores Co., 223 Pa. 160, 72 A. 377 (1909); Weber v. Perry, 201 S.C. 8, 21
S.E.2d 193 (1942). But see Heideck v. Kent Gen. Hosp., Inc., Civ. No. 313 (Del. June 8,
1982); Morris v. Park Newspapers of Georgia, Inc., 149 Ga. App. 674, 255 S.E.2d 131 (1979).
In addition, some courts have perceived the "surrounding circumstance" theory to include
representations made in employee handbooks. See infra note 140.
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for whatever time the party may serve. 8
Notwithstanding the fact that Wood lacked valid legal support for
his rule,19 it became incorporated in American common law20 and
remains the primary doctrine governing the duration of an employ-
ment relationship. 1 The early courts adopting his rule offered lit-
tle rationale to support it.22 As such, it has been inferred from the
socio-economic times from which it sprang. 3 Later, three major
theories developed to explain and support the rule: freedom of
contract,24 freedom of enterprise25 and mutuality of obligation.2 6
18. H. WOOD, MASTER AND*SERVANT § 134 at 272-73 (1877).
19. Wood cited only four American cases as authority for his rule: Wilder v. United
States, 5 Ct. CI. 462 (1869), rev'd on other grounds, 80 U.S. 254 (1871); DeBriar v. Minturn,
1 Cal. 450 (1851); Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co., 106 Mass. 56 (1870); and Franklin Mining
Co. v. Harris, 24 Mich. 115 (1871).
Wilder v. United States concerned a contract between the Army and a private busi-
nessman for the transportation of goods. It had nothing to do with general hirings as such.
DeBriar v. Minturn involved a controversy between a discharged bartender and his ex-em-
ployer over his right to occupy a room in the tavern after the bartender had been given
adequate notice to leave. It was essentially a case in unlawful ejection and only tangentially
touched on the employment relationship. It held only that the innkeeper had the right to
eject a person after proper notification. Tatterson v. Suffolk Mfg. Co. actually contradicts
Wood's assertion, since the court found no error in allowing a jury to determine the nature
of the employment contract from written and oral communications, usages of the trade, the
situation of the parties, the type of employment and all other circumstances which could
shed light on the true intent/agreement of the parties. Finally, Franklin Mining Co. v.
Harris found that indefinite duration by itself did not give the employer unfettered discre-
tion to dismiss its employees. See Note, supra note 5, at 341-42 n. 54 and accompanying
text; Annot. supra note 14, at 476.
20. The New York Court of Appeals appears to be the first court to adopt Wood's rule
by specific reference in Martin v. New York Life Ins. Co., 148 N.Y. 117, 42 N.E. 416 (1895).
After New York adopted it, other jurisdictions rapidly followed suit. See Annot., supra note
14, at 478.
21. See cases collected in Annot., 11 A.L.R. 469 (1921); Annot., 62 A.L.R.3d 271
(1980).
22. See Note, supra note 5, at 341-43.
23. Id. See also Summers, supra note 6, at 484-86.
24. In Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161 (1908), the Supreme Court stated:,
The right of a person to sell his labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its
essence, the same as the right of the purchaser of labor to prescribe the conditions
upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering to sell it. So the right
of the employee to quit the service of the employer, for whatever reason, is the same
as the right of the employer, for whatever reason, to dispense with the services of
such employees. ...
Id. at 174-75.
The principles of "freedom of contract" as well as "mutuality of obligation" are easily
recognized in the above quotation. This was the idea fostered throughout the United States
by the state courts in support of the rule. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 7; Note, supra
note 5, at 341-43; Blades, supra note 5, at 1419-21.
25. It was believed that the employment-at-will rule furthered economic growth and
entrepreneurship by increasing the freedom of the employer to hire and fire employees and
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The strongest use of the above theories was by the United States
Supreme Court in Adair v. United States.27 In Adair, the Court
used this rationale to support its holding that the right of an em-
ployer to discharge employees-at-will cannot be limited by federal
legislation. The Court opined that such legislation was repugnant
to the fifth amendment guarantees of personal liberty and liberty
of contract. 2' The Court further noted that the right of the em-
ployee to quit the service of the employer for whatever reason is
the same as the right of the employer to terminate the services of
the employee for whatever reason.2'
The first major break from the at-will rule came in 1930 when
the Supreme Court recognized congressional power under the
Commerce Clause to guarantee workers the right to organize and
bargain collectively without the threat of discharge or coercion, in
Texas and New Orleans Railroad v. Brotherhood of Railway and
Steamship Clerks.30 In effect, the decision in Texas and New Orle-
ans rejected Adair and cleared the way for future legislation
designed to protect the rights of employees.
In the past, the employment-at-will rule has been used to sus-
tain dismissals where the employees have filed complaints with
governmental regulatory agencies concerning allegedly improper
conduct of their employers, s1 or generally appeared as a witness
against their employer,3 2 filed worker's compensation claims,3 3 re-
restricting its liability. See Feinman, supra note 5, at 131-35; Note, supra note 5, at 341-43.
26. See supra note 24.
27. 208 U.S. 161 (1908). In Adair, the Supreme Court declared unconstitutional § 10
of the Erdman Act of June 1, 1898, ch. 370, 30 Stat. 424, which barred common carriers
from dismissing employees for union membership. 208 U.S. at 174-75. Accord Coppage v.
Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915) (state legislation similar to the Erdman Act met the same fate).
28. 208 U.S. at 174-75.
29. Id. at 174-78. This rationale continues to be utilized through the present day. See
Meadows v. Radio Indus., 222 F.2d 347 (7th Cir. 1955); Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hosp., 352
So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272
cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978).
30. 281 U.S. 548 (1930). In Texas and New Orleans Railroad the carrier decided to
discharge its unionized employees and deal only with a newly-created company union. The
carrier charged that the Railway Labor Act was unconstitutional and claimed it violated its
right under the first and fifth amendments to manage its property and to select and dis-
charge its employees as it saw fit. The Court used the "compelling state reason" rationale to
support its holding. Accord Phelps Dodge Corp. v. NLRB, 313 U.S. 177, 187 (1941); NLRB
v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1937).
31. Matin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
32. Odell v. Humble Oil & Refining Co., 201 F.2d 123 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 345
U.S. 941 (1953).
33. Loucks v. Star City Glass Co., 55.1 F.2d 745 (7th Cir. 1977).
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ported employer kickbacks,3 4 refused the sexual advances of their
employer,35 or had their spouses refuse same, 6 refused to take psy-
chological stress tests,37 indicated their availability for jury duty,"
refused to support political candidates favored by their employer,39
expressed their concern about the safety of their employer's prod-
uct,40 and filed a lawful claim against a fellow employee, or some
third party.'2 Moreover, the courts have used the employment-at-
will rule to strike down contracts for "permanent" employment,' 3
or for an otherwise definite duration," where such contracts were
not supported by adequate consideration,'5 or where they were
deemed to have violated the statute of frauds.'6
Today, there are federal and state statutes which protect an em-
ployee from some of the abuses of the past. An employer's right to
discharge is no longer absolute if the discharge is based on union
activity, 47 race, color, religion, sex or national origin,'4 age,'19 physi-
34. Martin v. Platt, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (Ind. App. 1979).
35. Fletcher v. Greiner, 106 Misc. 2d 564, 435 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
36. Comerford v. International Harvester Co., 235 Ala. 376, 178 So. 894 (1938).
37. Larsen v. Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977).
38. Mallard v. Boring, 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
39. Bell v. Faulkner, 75 S.W.2d 612 (Mo. Ct. App. 1934).
40. Geary V. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
41. Mitchell v. Stanolind Pipe Line Co., 184 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1950).
42. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Millonas, 206 Ala. 147, 89 So. 732 (1921).
43. See, e.g., Arentz v. Morse Dry Dock & Repair Co., 249 N.Y. 439, 164 N.E. 342
(1928)("permanent employment" is not lifetime employment, but is in fact indefinite em-
ployment and therefore terminable at will).
44. Atwood v. Curtiss Candy Co., 22 Ill. App. 2d 369, 161 N.E.2d 355 (1959).
45. Buian v. J. L. Jacobs & Co., 428 F.2d 531 (7th Cir. 1970). Generally, an employee's
work performance and/or continued service is not considered sufficient consideration to sup-
port a contract for permanent employment or employment for a definite time. However, the
presumption that a contract for an indefinite duration is terminable at will may be rebutted
by proof that the employee gave additional consideration. See, e.g., McNulty v. Borden,
Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
46. See, e.g., Lauter v. W & J Sloane, Inc., 417 F. Supp. 252 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (three
year oral contract of employment is unenforceable under the statute of frauds and is there-
fore a contract for indefinite duration and terminable at will). But see Rowe v. Noren Pat-
tern & Foundry Co., 91 Mich. App. 254, 283 N.W.2d 713 (1979), where the court stated:
"Where an oral contract may be completed in less than a year, even though it is clear that in
all probability the contract will extend for a period of years, the statute of frauds is not
violated." Id. at 257, 283 N.W.2d at 715. As such, the court found that Rowe's contract of
employment did not violate the statute of frauds because the occurrence of certain agreed
on contingencies could have made it for a shorter time.
47. National Labor Relations.Act §§ 7, 8(a)(1), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(1)(1976).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976). The Act makes it an unlawful employment practice for
employers "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discrimi-
nate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions or privileges
of employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin
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cal handicap,50 or veteran status."1 Other federal statutes protect
employees from discharge retaliation under certain "whistle blow-
ing" provisions.52 Though similar protection against discrimination
in discharge and hiring is found in various state statutes,53 an em-
ployer may still discharge employees for "good reason, bad reason,
and no reason at all absent discrimination . . .,.
..... " Id. § 2000e-2(a). There are exceptions, however, for bona fide occupational require-
ments tied to religion, sex or national origin. Id. § 2000e-2(e).
49. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980) (prohibits discrimination based on
age against persons between the ages of 40 and 70).
50. 29 U.S.C. § 793 (1976).
51. 38 U.S.C. § 2021 (1976) (provides that returning Vietnam veterans cannot be dis-
charged for one year except for "cause"). See also 38 U.S.C. § 2021(a)(2)(A)(1976) (provides
that veterans discharged from the armed services can return to the jobs they held prior to
such service).
52. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a) (1976) (prohibits retaliation or discharge for em-
ployee's support of other employee's civil rights); 42 U.S.C. § 5851(a)(3) (Supp. IV 1980)
(provides that no employer shall discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee
who has "assisted or participated, or is about to assist or participate in any manner in. . . a
proceeding under the [Energy Reorganization Act of 19741 or, in any other action to carry
out the purposes of [the Act] .. "); 42 U.S.C. § 7622(a) (Supp. IV 1980) (provides that an
employer may not discharge or otherwise discriminate against any employee because the
employee commenced, caused to commence or testified at a proceeding against the employer
for violation of the Air Pollution Prevention and Control Act); 33 U.S.C. § 1367 (1976) (pro-
vides that no employer may discharge or discriminate against an employee for instituting or
testifying at a proceeding against the employer for violation of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act); 45 U.S.C. § 441(a) (1976) (provides that a railroad engaged in interstate or
foreign commerce may not discharge or discriminate against an employee because the em-
ployee has filed a complaint, instituted any proceedings under, or related to the enforcement
of the federal railroad safety laws or has testified or is about to testify at such a proceeding);
id. § 441(b) (prohibits railroads from discharging or discriminating against an employee for
refusing to work under hazardous conditions); 29 U.S.C. § 660(c) (1976) (prohibits employ-
ers from discharging or discriminating against employees who have filed a complaint or in-
stituted a proceeding against the employer for violations of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act of 1970 or who refused to work under conditions they reasonably believed to be
dangerous to their safety); 29 U.S.C. §§ 215(a)(3), 216(b) (1976) (prohibits employers from
discharging or otherwise discriminating against employees for asserting their rights under
the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act); 15 U.S.C. §
1674(a) (1976) (prohibits an employer from terminating an employee because of garnish-
ment of wages for any one indebtedness).
53. See, e.g., DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 20 n.84.
54. Harper v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 385 F. Supp. 1001, 1004 (E.D. Mo. 1974),
aff'd, 525 F.2d 409 (8th Cir. 1975).
An attempt at federal legislative relief for employees-at-will was made in 1980, when
United States Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal introduced "The Corporate Democracy
Act" to the United States Congress which, if passed, was to be incorporated into the present
National Labor Relations Act. H.R. 7010, 96th Cong., 2d. Sess., 126 CONG. REc. 2490 (1980).
Title IV of the bill provided in pertinent part:
It is further declared to be the policy of the United States to protect employees in the
security of their employment by ensuring that they are not deprived of such employ-
ment on the basis of their having exercised their constitutional, civil, or other legal
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In view of the limited protection expressly afforded at-will em-
ployees by federal and state statutes"s and in recognition of the
gross injustices committed in the past by the application of the at-
will rule,56 some courts have fashioned exceptions to the rule. The
most common exceptions are those which focus on the implied cov-
enant of good faith,57 and those which focus on public policy.
5 8
rights, or because of their refusal to engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of
employment.
Id. § 401(a). The bill further provided that "[e]mployees shall have the further right to be
secure in their employment from discharge or adverse action with respect to the terms or
conditions of their employment except for just cause." Id. § 401(c). The bill defined just
cause as follows:
The term "just cause" shall be defined in accordance with the common law of labor
contracts established pursuant to section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act,
except that such term shall not include (A) the exercise of constitutional, civil, or
legal rights; (B) the refusal to engage in unlawful conduct as a condition of employ-
ment; (C) the refusal to submit to polygraph or other similar tests; or (D) the refusal
to submit to a search of someone's person or property, other than routine inspections,
conducted by an employer without legal process.
Id. § 401(b)(15). Unfortunately, the Corporate Democracy Act died at the end of the 96th
Congress with no formal action having been taken. Further, only a few states, Michigan,
Pennsylvania, South Dakota and Wisconsin, have attempted to pass similar legislation to
impose a "just cause" standard for discharge. The Employment-at- Will Issue LAB. REL.
REP. (BNA Spec. Report) at 9, (Nov. 22, 1982). It appears that the Michigan and Wisconsin
bills are still pending. Id. Pennsylvania's House Bill 1742 died in committee at the end of
the 1982 session by operation of law. South Dakota did succeed in passing a just cause
standard; however, it is specifically limited to contracts for employment at a stated annual
salary, which under the statute are deemed to be a hiring for one year and terminable only
for just cause during the initial year. S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. §§ 60-1 to 60-4 (1982).
55. See supra note 47-53 and accompanying text.
56. See supra notes 31-42 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 63-71 and accompanying text.
58. Courts in at least eighteen jurisdictions have recognized a judicially created public
policy exception to the at-will doctrine. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167,
610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980); Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn.
471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980); Jackson v. Minidoko Irrigation, 98 Idaho 330, 563 P.2d 54 (1977);
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978); Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas
Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Murphy v. City of Topeka-Shawnee County Dep't
of Labor Servs., 6 Kan. App. 2d 488, 630 P.2d 186 (1981); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows,
No. 81-CA-2460-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1982); Adler v. American Standard Corp., 290
Md. 615, 432 A.2d 464 (1981); Siles v. Travenal Laboratories, Inc., 13 Mass. App. 354, 433
N.E.2d 103 (1982); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Hen-
derson v. St. Louis Hous. Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. 1979); Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.,
114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974); Lally v. Copygraphics, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981);
McCullough v. Certain Teed Products Corp., 70 App. Div. 2d 771, 417 N.Y.S.2d 353 (1979);
Nees v. Hocks, 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975); Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Krystad v. Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 817, 400 P.2d 72 (1965);
Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
Courts in at least another nine jurisdictions have indicated that they might adopt the
public policy exception to the at-will doctrine under appropriate facts. Larsen v. Motor Sup-
ply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (Ct. App. 1977); M.B.M. Co. v. Counce, 268 Ark. 269,
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Those courts which have recognized causes of action for wrongful
discharge based on public policy considerations have found wrong-
ful: discharges based on the employee's refusal to violate a criminal
statute, whether or not the employee could be held individually
liable," discharges resulting from the exercise of a statutory
right,10 discharges resulting from the employee's fulfillment of a
statutory duty, 1 and discharges which violate general public
policy.62
III. GROWTH OF JUDICIAL ExCEPTIONS
A. Implied Covenant of Good Faith
Perhaps the broadest exception to the at-will rule yet to be de-
veloped is the supporting rationale in Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co.68
Until Monge in 1974, and since the inception of the at-will doc-
trine, the notion of good faith had never been viewed as a limita-
tion on an employer's freedom to discharge at-will employees.64
Since Monge, other jurisdictions have recognized the employer's
obligation to deal with their employees fairly and in good faith al-
though they have not explicitly adopted Monge's rationale.6
596 S.W.2d 681 (1980); Lampe v. Presbyterian Medical Center, 41 Colo. App. 465, 590 P.2d
513 (1978); Abrisz v. Pulley Freight Lines, 270 N.W.2d 454 (Iowa 1978); Keneally v. Orgain,
606 P.2d 127 (Mont. 1980); Mau v. Omaha Nat'l Bank, 207 Neb. 308, 299 N.W.2d 147
(1980); K.W.S. Mfg., Inc. v. McMahon, 565 S.W.2d 368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978); Krystad v.
Lau, 65 Wash. 2d 817, 400 P.2d 72 (1965); Ward v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 95 Wis. 2d 372, 290
N.W.2d 536 (Ct. App. 1980).
Eight jurisdictions have specifically rejected a judicially created public policy exception
to the at-will doctrine. Bender Ship Repair, Inc. v. Stevens, 379 So. 2d 594 (Ala. 1980); Ivy
v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, Inc.,
381 So. 2d 265 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1980); Goodroe v. Georgia Power Co., 148 Ga. App. 193,
251 S.E.2d 51 (1978); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981); Dock-
ery v. Lampart Table Co., 36 N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246
S.E.2d 215 (1978); Whitaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. 1981); Jones v.
Keough, 137 Vt. 562, 409 A.2d 581 (1979).
For an in-depth listing of other cases from the above jurisdictions concerning the recog-
nition and nonrecognition of causes of actions for wrongful/abusive discharge, see Annot. 12
A.L.R.4th 544 (1982); The Employment-at-Will Issue LAB. REL. REP. (BNA Spec. Report)
at 11 (Nov. 22, 1982). See also infra notes 72-95 and accompanying text.
59. See infra notes 74-76 and accompanying text.
60. See infra notes 78-84 and accompanying text.
61. See infra notes 85-89 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 93-96 and accompanying text.
63. 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
64. DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 24.
65. See, e.g., Moore v. Home Ins. Co., 601 F.2d 1072 (9th Cir. 1979); Magnan v. Ana-
conda Indus., 37 Conn. Sup. 38, 429 A.2d 492 (1980); Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.,
373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977). California courts have adopted their own version of
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In Monge, the plaintiff-employee had been hired by the defen-
dant for an indefinite period of time to work on a conversion ma-
chine. Shortly thereafter, when the plaintiff applied for a higher
paying job as a press machine operator, she was told by her fore-
man that she would have to be "nice" in order to get the better
job. Soon after the plaintiff received the higher paying job, the
foreman invited her out on a date. The plaintiff declined. After
only three weeks the press machine job was eliminated and Monge
was demoted. The plaintiff claimed that she was harassed and ulti-
mately fired because she refused to date her foreman. The fore-
man's actions were known to the defendant's personnel manager
who, when approached by the plaintiff, asked her "not to make
trouble." e Monge sued for breach of an employment contract for
an indefinite period of time and the court, in allowing the cause of
action, held:
In all employment contracts, whether at will or for a definite term, the em-
ployer's interest in running his business as he sees fit must be balanced
against the interest of the employee in maintaining his employment, and
the public's interest in maintaining a proper balance between the two ....
We hold that a termination by the employer of a contract of employment at
will which is motivated by bad faith or malice or based on retaliation is not
in the best interest of the economic system or the public good and consti-
tutes a breach of the employment contract .... 67
the "good faith" exception. They look to the longevity of the plaintiff's employment and
surrounding circumstances to see if the contract qualifies for an "implied-in-law" covenant
of good faith. Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722
(1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 171 Cal. Rptr. 917, modified, 117
Cal. App. 3d 520a (1981). However, other jurisdictions have specifically rejected the implied
good faith exception. See Lekich v. IBM Corp., 469 F. Supp. 485 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Larsen v.
Motor Supply Co., 117 Ariz. 507, 573 P.2d 907 (1977); Catania v. Eastern Airlines, 381 So.
2d 265 (1980); Schwartz v. Michigan Sugar Co., 106 Mich. App. 471, 308 N.W.2d 459 (1981);
Whittaker v. Care-More, Inc., 621 S.W.2d 395 (Tenn. 1981); Jones v. Keough, 137 Vt. 562,
409 A.2d 581 (1979).
66. 114 N.H. at 132, 316 A.2d at 550.
67. Id. at 133, 316 A.2d at 551-52 (citations omitted). Monge is obviously a hybrid
which combines the notions of good faith and public policy. Basically, the Monge court said
public policy implies a covenant of good faith in all employment contracts. Monge has been
cited for both propositions.
The dissent disagreed with the majority's rule, claiming that even if such a cause of
action existed the facts of the case did not warrant the finding of same. The dissent noted
that plaintiff's discharge came eight months after her foreman's invitation, that the press
job was eliminated due to economic necessity and that Monge's lack of seniority was the
controlling factor in her demotion. Further, the dissent noted that no evidence was
presented showing that the foreman persisted in his endeavors, that the only evidence on
Monge's behalf was her own testimony and, that the acts of harassment were two isolated
incidents in which the foreman commented about the type of work she was assigned. Not-
withstanding all of this, Justice Grimes claimed that the plaintiff should have been pre-
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Another leading case which relied on the implied covenant of
good faith was Fortune v. National Cash Register Co.' s In For-
tune, the Supreme Court of Massachusetts relied on the Monge
rational to sustain a jury verdict in the court below. Fortune was a
sixty-one year old plaintiff who claimed he was wrongfully dis-
charged to enable his employer to avoid paying him certain com-
missions due him on a five million dollar contract. Fortune's con-
tract specifically provided for termination at will. The Fortune
court, citing Monge, held that there was an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing in the contract and that the defendant
had breached the contract by using the at-will provision to avoid
paying accrued commissions.69
The overwhelming breadth of the Monge decision was short
lived, however.70 Although it has been cited by a number of juris-
dictions in cases concerning the concept of wrongful or abusive dis-
charge, most jurisdictions which have addressed the concept of
wrongful or abusive discharge have relied on violations of articu-
lated public policy in finding that an employee had a valid cause of
action for wrongful termination.7 ' Perhaps drawing in the reins of
the "good faith" exception was judicially wise. Such a broad depar-
cluded from bringing such a suit because the plaintiff was a member of the union; the pro-
tection given by the union contract governing the right to discharge and the grievance
procedures established therein removed her from the class of employees who otherwise
might need some protection from an abusive discharge. Id. at 134-35, 316 A.2d at 552-53
(Grimes, J., dissenting).
68. 373 Mass. 96, 364 N.E.2d 1251 (1977).
69. Id. at 103-04, 364 N.E.2d at 1256-57.
70. 'Recently, the Supreme Court of New Hampshire reexamined its holding in Monge.
In Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980), the New Hampshire
Supreme Court limited Monge by stating that Monge applies only "to a situation where an
employee is discharged because he performed an act that public policy would encourage, or
refused to do that which public policy would condemn." Id. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274. The
court went on to say that if an employee has a cause of action under state or federal statute,
as Howard did, then that remedy is his exclusive remedy and a plaintiff may not look to the
courts for another one. Id.
On the same day Howard was decided, the New Hampshire Supreme Court decided
another case, Tice v. Thomson, 120 N.H. 313, 414 A.2d 1284 (1980), and again refused to use
the Monge rationale to allow a cause of action for a discharged public employee whose job
was terminable by the Governor, without cause. The court held that Monge only applied to
the private sector. See DeGiuseppe, supra note 1, at 26.
Further, only a limited number of cases have explicitly followed Monge; see Pstragow-
ski v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 553 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1977); Foley v. Community Oil Co., 64
F.R.D. 561 (D. N.H. 1974). These cases were decided by federal courts sitting in New
Hampshire who were required to follow New Hampshire substantive law, which at the time
was found in Monge. They could not impose limits on Monge as could the New Hampshire
Supreme Court.
71. See supra note 58.
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ture from the status quo may be unwarranted without legislative
intervention to weigh the pros and cons of the "good faith" stan-
dard and to define clearly the metes and bounds of such claims. To
open wide the doors of the courts to all employees who claim "bad
faith" without legislative direction would result in years of litiga-
tion before workable guidelines could be determined. And, al-
though both employers and employees would be economically
harmed by such hit-and-miss tactics, it is possible that the em-
ployer would bear the brunt of the harm since juries may be
swayed more easily to side with the employee when they have no
guidelines to follow. 72 Although this cannot be sanctioned, to con-
clude that no judicially created change is warranted would be
equally wrong.73 A viable compromise can be seen in the creation
of a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge vio-
lates general public policy.
B. Public Policy Exceptions
1. Refusing to Violate Criminal Statutes
The seminal case which recognized a cause of action for wrongful
discharge where the employee's dismissal was based on his refusal
to violate a criminal statute was Petermann v. Local 396, Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters." In Petermann, the employee,
who was subpoenaed to testify at a legislative hearing, received in-
structions from his employer to commit perjury at the hearing.
Nevertheless, the employee testified truthfully and was discharged
the next day. Although the lower court refused a cause of action to
Petermann, on appeal the California Court of Appeal reversed the
lower court's ruling. Despite its recognition of the at-will doctrine,
the court of appeal claimed that such a rule had to be limited in
view of the state's public policy against perjury. The court stated:
It would be obnoxious to the interests of the state and contrary to public
policy and sound morality to allow an employer to discharge any employee
• . . on the ground that the employee declined to commit perjury, an act
specifically enjoined by statute .... [I]n order to more fully effectuate the
state's declared policy against perjury, the civil law, too, must deny the em-
ployer his generally unlimited right to discharge an employee whose em-
ployment is for an unspecified duration, when the reason for the dismissal is
72. See Blades, supra note 5, at 1431.
73. Id. Contra Note, Limiting the Right to Terminate at Will - Have the Courts
Forgotten the Employer? 35 VAND. LAW. Rsv. 201 (1982).
74. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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the employee's refusal to commit perjury.75
Since Petermann, other jurisdictions have allowed at-will employ-
ees to sue for wrongful discharge if the discharge was based on the
employee's refusal to violate a criminal statute.s
2. Exercising A Statutory Right
Some jurisdictions have recognized a cause of action for wrongful
discharge when an employee has been discharged for exercising a
statutory right." This situation most frequently occurs when an
employee has been discharged for filing a worker's compensation
claim. Not all courts, however, have recognized a cause of action
for wrongful discharge on these grounds.78 Those which have re-
75. Id. at 188, 344 P.2d at 27. California also has recognized a cause of action for
wrongful discharge when an employee was discharged for refusing to participate in an al-
leged price-fixing scheme. See Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d
1330, 164 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1980).
76. In Sheets v. Teddy's Frosted Foods, Inc., 179 Conn. 471, 427 A.2d 385 (1980), a
Connecticut court recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the employee's
discharge was a direct result of advising his employer that certain products were mislabeled
and in violation of the Connecticut Uniform Food, Drug & Cosmetic Act. The court noted
that the Act also would have subjected the employee to personal criminal sanctions had he
not reported the infringement to his employer. The court stated that "an employee should
not be put to an election whether to risk criminal sanction or to jeopardize his continued
employment." Id. at 480, 427 A.2d at 389.
In Trombetta v. Detroit, T. & I.R.R., 81 Mich. App. 489, 265 N.W.2d 385 (1978), an at-
will employee was discharged because he refused to falsify state pollution control reports. In
recognizing a cause of action based upon an employee's refusal to cover up his employer's
violation of the state air pollution statute, the court stated, "[it is without question that the
public policy of this state does not condone attempts to violate its duly enacted laws....
[Falsifying pollution reports) clearly violate[s] the law of this state." Id. at 495-96, 265
N.W.2d at 388.
A New Jersey court recognized a cause of action for wrongful discharge in O'Sullivan v.
Mallon, 160 N.J. Super. 416, 390 A.2d 149 (Law Div. 1978), where an x-ray technician, em-
ployed at-will, was discharged for refusing to perform unauthorized catheterizations. New
Jersey state law prohibited all but licensed nurses from performing catheterizations. In view
of this, the court stated that "an employment at will may not be terminated by an employer
in retaliation for an employee's refusal to perform an illegal act." Id. at 418, 390 A.2d at 150.
But see, Ivy v. Army Times Publishing Co., 428 A.2d 831 (D.C. 1981). In Ivy, the lower
court denied a cause of action to an employee whose dismissal was based solely upon his
refusal to commit perjury at a state administrative proceeding before the District of Colum-
bia's Wage and Hour Board. This decision was reached despite the employer's admission
that that was the sole reason for his discharge. Ivy's petition for a rehearing en banc was
denied summarily without opinion since a majority did not vote in favor of granting it. The
dissent would have granted the petition because it presented a question of "exceptional
importance." Id. at 831 (Ferren, J., dissenting).
77. See infra notes 80, 82 and accompanying text.
78. At least eight courts have refused to grant a cause of action to employees who were
fired for filing worker's compensation claims. Martin v. Tapley, 360 So. 2d 708 (Ala. 1978);
Segal v. Arrow Indus. Corp., 364 So. 2d 89 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978); Johnson v. National
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fused to recognize a cause of action in such cases have held that
the employee's exclusive remedy lies in the state's worker's com-
pensation statutes 9 and the benefits provided therein for the em-
ployee's period of disability only.
The first case which afforded a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge based on an employee's filing of a worker's compensation
claim was Frampton v. Central Indiana Gas Co.80 In Frampton,
the employee, having received a work related injury, filed a
worker's compensation claim. The employee received a settlement
check as a result of the claim, but one month later was fired when
she attempted to return to work. The lower court dismissed her
complaint claiming she failed to state a cause of action for which
relief could be given. The Supreme Court of Indiana, however, re-
versed the lower court and reasoned that the denial of a cause of
action to Frampton, and others similarly situated, would defeat the
humane purposes of the worker's compensation act. The court
stated:
The Act creates a duty in the employer to compensate employees for work-
related injuries . . . and a right in the employee to receive such compensa-
tion. But in order for the goals of the Act to be realized and for public
policy to be effectuated, the employee must be able to exercise his right in
an unfettered fashion without being subject to reprisal. If employers are
permitted to penalize employees for filing workmen's compensation claims,
a most important public policy will be undermined. The fear of being dis-
charged would have a deleterious effect on the exercise of a statutory
right.8 1
In Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc.,$2 the court dismissed the employer's
contention that the worker's compensation statutes provide the
sole remedy for an employee. The court reasoned that a wrongful
discharge cause of action is separate and apart from a worker's
compensation claim. In such an action the employee is not seeking
additional compensation as a result of his or her injuries but rather
is seeking retribution for an unjust dismissal based on the exercise
Beef Packing Co., 220 Kan. 52, 551 P.2d 779 (1976); Stephens v. Justiss-Mears Oil Co., 300
So. 2d 510 (La. App. 1974); Kelly v. Mississippi Valley Gas. Co., 397 So. 2d 874 (Miss. 1981);
Christy v. Petrus, 365 Mo. 1187, 295 S.W.2d 122 (1956); Dockery v. Lampart Table Co., 36
N.C. App. 293, 244 S.E.2d 272, cert. denied, 295 N.C. 465, 246 S.E.2d 215 (1978); Raley v.
Darling Shop of Greenville, Inc., 216 S.C. 536, 59 S.E.2d 148 (1950).
79. See supra note 78.
80. 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973).
81. Id. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427 (emphasis in original).
82. 74 Ill. 2d 172, 384 N.E.2d 353 (1978).
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of a statutory right.8 3
Those courts which have not recognized a cause of action for
wrongful discharge, when the discharge is based upon the filing of
a worker's compensation claim, have placed the employee in a pre-
carious position. In those jurisdictions, employees may be forced to
choose between exercising their statutory rights, by receiving disa-
bility benefits for work related injuries, or maintaining their jobs.
Unscrupulous employers, attempting to keep the costs of their
worker's compensation coverage down, could use job security as a
leverage to coerce injured employees into choosing between no pay
or compensation during their periods of disability, or no job once
their periods of disability have ended. Such an interpretation,
which allows dismissals based on the filing of a worker's compensa-
tion claim, makes these acts self-defeating.' A general public pol-
icy exception to the at-will rule would accomodate those instances
where an employee was terminated because he filed a worker's
compensation claim. Further, an exception based on general public
policy will support the remedial purpose of all worker's compensa-
tion laws, which is to protect an employee who has been injured on
the job from economic disaster. This economic protection should
not extend just to the employee's period of disability. In many in-
stances, as a result of his injuries, an employee may be unable to
obtain employment elsewhere even though he is capable of per-
forming his old job or another job available only through his em-
ployer. Thus, an injured employee would know he is protected by
the worker's compensation laws during his period of disability, and
by the common law against unjust dismissal once his disability has
ceased. Further, without a general public policy exception to pro-
tect such employees, the entire state could be economically harmed
by increased burdens on the welfare rolls. Clearly, protecting em-
ployees from unjust discharges based on their having filed a
worker's compensation claim is in the public's best interest.
83. Id. at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358. Other jurisdictions have recognized a public policy
exception to the at-will rule when the dismissal is based on the filing of a worker's compen-
sation claim. See Meyer v. Byron Jackson, Inc., 120 Cal. App. 3d 58, 174 Cal. Rptr. 428
(1981); Firestone Textile Co. v. Meadows, No. 81-CA-2460-MR (Ky. Ct. App. Nov. 12, 1982);
Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich. App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Henderson v. St. Louis
Hous. Auth., 605 S.W.2d 800 (Mo. Ct. App. 1979); LaIly v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J. Super.
162, 413 A.2d 960 (App. Div. 1980), aff'd, 85 N.J. 668, 428 A.2d 1317 (1981); Brown v. Trans-
con Lines, 284 Or. 597, 588 P.2d 1087 (1978). See also cases listed in Annot., 12 A.L.R.4th
544 § 16.
84. See Frampton v. Indiana Cent. Gas Co., 260 Ind. at 251, 297 N.E.2d at 427; Kelsay
v. Motorola, Inc., 74 IlM. 2d at 184, 384 N.E.2d at 358.
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3. Fulfilling a Statutory Duty
The public policy exception has also been applied to situations
in which an employee was terminated for fulfilling a statutory
duty. All of the cases in this category thus far involve the perform-
ance of jury duty. The first case to recognize such a cause of action
under this circumstance was Nees v. Hocks.8 5 In Nees, the court
upheld a jury verdict in favor of an at-will employee who was dis-
charged after being subpoenaed for jury duty. Against her em-
ployer's expressed wishes, Nees told the court clerk that she would
serve on jury duty. Ultimately, she did serve and was fired. The
court said that the jury system and jury duty are regarded as high
priorities on the scale of American institutions and obligations and
that, if an employer were permitted to discharge an employee with
impunity for fulfilling her obligation of jury duty, the jury system
would be adversely affected and the will of the community
thwarted.8
Nonetheless, not all jurisdictions have granted a cause of action
to an employee when the dismissal was based on having reported
for jury service. In Mallard v. Boring,8 7 the court did not seek to
delineate a public policy exception from the state constitution or
other statutes but instead declined, absent some statutory authori-
zation, to intrude upon the rights of the parties to the at-will con-
tract.8 8 The Mallard court held that "[i]f public policy requires
that this protection [against dismissal] should be afforded prospec-
tive jurors, we feel it should be done by the Legislature ....
Ironically, the Mallard decision came from the same state as did
Petermann,9" where a cause of action was granted to an employee
who refused to commit perjury. The divergent result appears to
stem from the Mallard court's confusion of "cause of action" with
"verdict for the plaintiff." The Mallard court said "[a]lthough we
may feel that this would be a good public policy, to so hold would
establish a rule which would apply in all instances where persons
are discharged from their employment because they have made
85. 272 Or. 210, 536 P.2d 512 (1975).
86. Id. at 218-19, 536 P.2d at 516. See also Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa.
Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978)(the necessity of having citizens freely available for jury ser-
vice is a recognized facet of public policy, and an employer's intrusion into this area is
actionable).
87. 182 Cal. App. 2d 390, 6 Cal. Rptr. 171 (1960).
88. Id. at 396, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
89. Id.
90. 174 Cal. App. 2d 184, 344 P.2d 25 (1959).
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themselves available for jury service, regardless of the circum-
stances." 91 The Mallard court failed to realize that if there are
other circumstances, these circumstances would be the employer's
defense. The recognition of a cause of action does not guarantee a
verdict in favor of the plaintiff, it merely guarantees him his day in
court. The question of whether a dismissal was based on jury ser-
vice or other reasons is a question of fact to be determined by the
trier of facts, the jury.92 Where it is clear that the public policy
exists, the courts must recognize a cause of action to protect those
persons seeking to effectuate it. The fact that prospective jurors
are subject to contempt of court sanctions if they fail to report for
jury service shows how strong a public policy surrounds jury duty.
This public policy should not be ignored.
4. Violations of General Public Policy
The broadest application of the public policy exception has oc-
curred where courts, unable to find express legislative or constitu-
tional references upon which to base a cause of acion for wrongful
discharge, have permitted relief if the employer violated what the
court considered to be the state's public policy in general. None-
theless, most decisions based on the general public policy excep-
tion have attempted to reconcile their decisions by referring to
some state statute upon which a cause of action could be drawn.
In Harless v. First National Bank," the plaintiff filed suit for
wrongful discharge claiming that he was terminated solely because
of his attempts to secure his employer's compliance with certain
federal and state consumer protection laws. The Harless court
found that the bank's action contravened the public policy articu-
lated in a West Virginia consumer credit protection act. The
state's policy to protect consumers from payment of illegal and un-
authorized interest extended a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge to an employee who was dismissed as a result of his at-
tempts to secure his employer's compliance with the act. The court
reasoned that if a cause of action was not recognized, the public
policy of the state of West Virginia would be frustrated.94
91. 182 Cal. App. 2d at 396, 6 Cal. Rptr. at 175.
92. See, e.g., Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119
(1978) (where two plausible reasons exist for the discharge, and one is in clear violation of
the state's public policy, then it is within the province of the jury to decide which is the true
one).
93. 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
94. Id. at 276.
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Another leading case in which the court adopted a general public
policy exception to the at-will rule is Palmateer v. International
Harvester Co.9 5 In Palmateer, an at-will employee was fired be-
cause he informed law enforcement officials that a fellow employee
might have been violating Illinois criminal statutes. The plaintiff
had agreed to work with the authorities to gather evidence against
his co-employee. In recognizing a cause of action for Palmateer, the
court stated:
There is no public policy more important and more fundamental than the
one favoring the effective protection of the lives and property of citizens.
No specific constitutional or statutory provision requires a citizen to
take an active part in the ferreting out and prosecution of crime, but public
policy nevertheless favors citizen crime-fighters. "Public policy favors the
exposure of crime, and the cooperation of citizens possessing knowledge
thereof is essential to effective implementation of that policy. Persons act-
ing in good faith who have probable cause to believe crimes have been com-
mitted should not be deterred from reporting them . . . ." Public policy
favors Palmateer's conduct in volunteering information to the law-enforce-
ment agency . . . [as well as his] agreement to assist in the investigation
and prosecution of the suspected crime."
Harless and Palmateer, however, apparently represent the mi-
nority position. Most courts have denied relief to employees dis-
charged for informing law enforcement authorities about the cor-
ruption or criminal activities of their employer. For instance, at-
will employees have been denied relief when discharged for report-
ing, either to law enforcement agencies or to corporate officials,
that corporate officers violated state security laws,97 for reporting
that a corporate vice-president was taking kickbacks," for uncov-
ering evidence of illegal foreign currency manipulations," and for
possessing knowledge of criminal activity within the employer's
corporation even though the knowledge was acquired through a
corporate sanctioned investigation of which the plaintiff was in
charge.100
One is forced to ask, "Why are Harless and Palmateer the ex-
ception rather than the norm?" The answer is clear. This historical
position of the at-will rule is so strongly embedded in American
95. 85 Ill. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981).
96. Id. at 132-33, 421 N.E.2d at 879-80 (citation omitted) (quoting Joiner v. Benton
Community Bank, 82 Ill. 2d 40, 411 N.E.2d 229 (1980)).
97. Matin v. Jacuzzi, 224 Cal. App. 2d 549, 36 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1964).
98. Martin v. Platt, 68 Ind. App. 258, 386 N.E.2d 1026 (1979).
99. Edwards v. Citibank, 100 Misc. 2d 59, 418 N.Y.S.2d 269 (Sup. Ct. 1979).
100. O'Neill v. ARA Serve., Inc., 457 F. Supp. 182 (E.D. Pa. 1978).
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case law that few courts feel free to move away from its dictates.
The courts generally are reluctant to make exceptions, unless the
termination of an employee clearly constitutes a wrong expressly
forbidden by statute. In view of this, one cannot help but feel that
in addition to justice being blind, she is now deaf. Those courts
which have denied relief have failed to realize that their legisla-
tures, in enacting the crimes code and other statutes for their re-
spective state, have given their courts the wherewithal to provide
necessary relief in such instances. Since it is the duty of the courts
to ensure that the law is enforced, it is also their duty to provide
protection to those persons who seek to have the law upheld. In
recognizing a cause of action based on general public policy for em-
ployees so discharged, the courts will ensure continued compliance
with state law, or in the least ensure that those persons who have
violated those laws will be called upon to answer for their actions.
In addition, courts have been overly cautious about employing
the general public policy exception in other situations to redress
wrongful discharges which resulted from conduct obviously in the
community's best interest. In Hinrichs v. Tranquilaire Hospital,0 '
suit was filed by a former hospital employee who claimed that she
was dismissed for refusing to falsify hospital records. Summary
judgment was affirmed as the court noted that employment-at-will
may be terminated by either party with or without cause notwith-
standing malice or improper reasons. The court concluded by stat-
ing that the creation of a cause of action for wrongful discharge is
best left to the legislature.
1
02
The Hinrichs court was not the first court to justify its inaction
by deferring to the powers of the legislature. Most courts defer in
such cases because they do not wish to be accused of judicial legis-
lation. However, one should question the soundness of such a
deferral in this situation. The employment-at-will rule is a judicial
creation.103 Few states have incorporated it into their statutory
law, and even statutory law is subject to judicial interpretation. ' "
101. 352 So. 2d 1130 (Ala. 1977).
102. Id. at 1131.
103. See supra notes 13-29 and accompanying text.
104. California has codified the employment-at-will rule in CAL. LAB. CODE § 2922
(West 1971), which provides: "An employment, having no specified term, may be terminated
at the will of either party on notice to the other. ... Employment for a specified term means
no employment for a period greater than one month." Id. Notwithstanding codification of
the rule, however, California courts have shown their willingness to find an "implied cove-
nant of good faith and fair dealing" in employment-at-will contracts based on the totality of
the parties' relationship with emphasis placed on the employee's longevity and the common
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Moreover, the likelihood of statutory relief is dubious in this situa-
tion, in view of the fact that most statutory reforms are a result of
a strong lobby.105 Although the employees-at-will constitute a ma-
jority of the American work force, they have no such lobby and it
is doubtful that organized labor will volunteer.10 6
IV. PENNSYLVANIA
A. The Case Law
The at-will rule is as embedded in Pennsylvania law as it is in
most jurisdictions 0 7 and, as in most jurisdictions, Pennsylvania
holds that a contract for "permanent" employment is actually a
contract for an indefinite duration and therefore terminable at
will.108 Employees-at-will in Pennsylvania are no different from
those in other states of the union. They have been subject to the
same abuses,' have striven for the same relief, and recently have
been successful in obtaining relief in limited circumstances." 0
Pennsylvania courts, though expressing a willingness to listen to
practices of the employer. See Cleary v. American Airlines, 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 455-56,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722, 729 (1980); Pugh v. See's Candies, Inc., 116 Cal. App. 3d 311, 313, 171
Cal. Rptr. 917, 919-20, modified, 117 Cal. App. 3d 520a (1981).
105. See Blades, supra note 5, at 1433-34; Peck, supra note 5, at 3.
106. See Blades, supra note 5, at 1434.
107. Coffin v. Landis, 46 Pa. 426 (1864); Henry v. Pittsburgh & L.E.R.R., 139 Pa. 289,
21 A. 157 (1891). However, it should be noted that Pennsylvania recognizes the at-will rule
as a mere presumption that can be rebutted if the plaintiff presents evidence showing that
the contract was for a specific term. Lubrecht v. Laurel Stripping Co., 387 Pa. 393, 127 A.2d
687 (1956).
Pennsylvania does recognize the doctrine of additional consideration, and if the plain-
tiff can show additional consideration has been given then the contract will be taken out of
the at-will rule. Weidman v. United Cigar Stores Co., 223 Pa. 160, 72 A. 377 (1909). Addi-
tionally, Pennsylvania recognizes the presumption that a contract for a specific term renews
itself for an identical term if the employee continues to work beyond the end of the initial
term. Smith v. Shallcross, 165 Pa. Super. 472, 69 A.2d 156 (1949). It appears that Pennsyl-
vania never employed the rationale that a hiring at so much per stated term is a contract for
that term. Hogle v. DeLong Hook & Eye Co., 248 Pa. 471, 94 A. 190 (1915); Tainer v. Laird,
320 Pa. 414, 183 A. 40 (1936).
108. Lightcap v. Keaggy, 128 Pa. Super. 348, 194 A. 347 (1937).
109. See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Serv. E. & G. Co., 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977) (cause
of action denied an employee who refused to comply with a supervisor's demands for a
sexual relationship); Corgan v. George F. Lee Coal Co., 218 Pa. 386, 67 A. 655 (1907) (cause
of action denied employee/shareholder who was dismissed because he demanded to see the
corporate books).
110. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974) (Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court acknowledged its willingness to develop an exception to the at-will rule
under the proper circumstances); see also Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 355 Pa.




their claims, have narrowly defined the exceptions and have
strictly construed them in favor of the employer.
The public policy exception was first tested in Pennsylvania in
the case of Geary v. United States Steel Corp."1 In Geary, a sales-
man sued for wrongful discharge, claiming his dismissal was in re-
taliation for bringing the unsafe nature of certain tubular products
manufactured for the oil and gas industry to the attention of his
superiors. By the time the case came to trial the tubular products
had been pulled from the market because the re-evaluation con-
ducted at plaintiff's insistence proved them to be dangerous." 2
The Geary court felt this was sufficient recompsense. Clinging to
the fact that Geary went over his immediate supervisor's head
before he could get any action on retesting the tubes, the court
said he obviously made a "nuisance" of himself and that his dis-
charge was to "preserve administrative order.""" As such, the
court held:
[W]here the complaint itself discloses a plausible and legitimate reason for
terminating an at will employment relationship [i.e., Geary's constant ef-
forts to bring a defective product to the attention of his employer] and no
clear public policy is violated thereby, an employee at will has no right of
action against his employer for wrongful discharge. 1'
111. 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974). Geary was a four-to-three decision. Since the
composition of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court has changed considerably since 1974, it is
possible that should a similar case now come before it that the result would be in favor of
recognizing a cause of action based on the facts presented in Geary.
112. It should be noted that U.S. Steel denied that the product was withdrawn from
the market as a result of Geary's efforts and offered to prove that it had been marketed
successfully, without incident, for several years. The court held that such proof was irrele-
vant at the preliminary objection stage, id. at 174 n.3, 319 A.2d at 175 n.3, since the court
was obligated to accept all properly pled facts as admitted for the purpose of testing the
complaint. Id. at 174, 319 A.2d at 175, (citing Balsbaugh v. Rowland, 447 Pa. 423, 290 A.2d
85 (1972)).
113. 456 Pa. at 184-85, 319 A.2d at 180. In Geary, the appellant proposed another
theory under which he sought relief. Geary asserted that the tort of "interference with pro-
spective business advantage" was applicable to his situation. He argued that the expectan-
cies which the law protects from interference by outsiders should also be protected from the
actions of the parties to the relationship if one of the parties abuses its rights. The court
found that even if a cause of action could be carved from the general rule, the facts in Geary
did not support such an action since specific intent to harm, not general or incidental, is one
of the prerequisities for such a tort action. Id. at 178-79, 319 A.2d at 177-78. However, in
McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979) the court, relying on the dicta of
Geary, found the requisite intent to support a cause of action for wrongful discharge on
these grounds. See infra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
114. 456 Pa. at 184-85, 319 A.2d at 180. Justice Roberts wrote a fiery dissent in which
he stated:
[S]ociety's interest in protecting itself from dangerous products manifestly presents a
mandate to the court to recognize a cause of action for wrongful discharge. That a
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Although the Geary court denied relief to the plaintiff, it has
been hailed as a giant step forward, for it did acknowledge Penn-
sylvania's willingness to recognize a cause of action for wrongful
discharge where a clear and compelling mandate of public policy is
violated. 15 Unfortunately, the majority in Geary was convinced
that no clear mandate of public policy was threatened or violated
by Geary's discharge. It refused to recognize a concern for public
safety as a public policy of the state. 116 The Geary court claimed
that there was no Pennsylvania statutory or constitutional provi-
sion upon which to base such an exception. A close examination of
Pennsylvania statutory law will reveal that the majority overlooked
many sources on which it could have based a public policy
exception.
Since the Geary court insisted on finding an exception to the
rule only where the public policy was expressed clearly by statute
or state constitution, fairness to the plaintiff required that the
court exhaust all of the statutory and constitutional provisions
available. It is possible that the court could have found an excep-
tion based on section 2705 of the Pennsylvania Crimes Code, 7
which makes it a second degree misdemeanor for a person to en-
gage in conduct which places or may place another person in dan-
ger of death or serious bodily injury. A manufacturer who places
defective merchandise on the market recklessly endangers the life
of another. 8
loyal and responsible employee should be summarily and without cause or notice dis-
charged for complying with his duty to communicate relevant information to his
superiors provides further justification for affording [Geary] an opportunity to pre-
sent his claim. That [Geary] was discharged without cause for doing that which, had
he failed to do, he would have been subject to dismissal with cause amply demon-
strates the illogic of the majority's refusal to recognize in these circumstances a cause
of action for wrongful discharge.
Id. at 191-92, 319 A.2d at 184 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
115. 456 Pa. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
116. Id. at 184, 319 A.2d at 180.
117. 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 2705 (Purdon 1973).
118. Id. Since at least 1904, corporations have been considered capable of committing
"personal crimes" such as homicide. See United States v. Van Schaick, 134 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y.
1904) (corporation which failed to provide adequate life preservers on its ships can be tried
and convicted of manslaughter even though no appropriate punishment was provided by
statute under such circumstances); People v. Ebasco Servs., Inc., 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354
N.Y.S.2d 807 (1974); State v. Ford Motor Co., No. 5324 (Ind. Super. Ct. filed Sept. 13, 1978)
(corporation indicted for reckless homicide and charged with recklessly designing and man-
ufacturing a vehicle and allowing it to remain on the public highways). See generally Note,
Corporate Homicide: A New Assault on Corporate Decision-making, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW.
911 (1979). In view of the above, there should be no prohibition in turning to the crimes
code of a state to determine if public safety is a recognized policy supported by statute.
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Perhaps more to the point would be the health and safety stat-
utes promulgated in regard to the Department of Labor and Indus-
try.119 The general purpose of the Act was revealed in its title, "An
act to provide for the safety and to protect the health and morals
of persons while employed; prescribing certain regulations and re-
strictions concerning places where persons are employed, and the
equipment, apparatus, materials, devices and machinery used
therein . . ,,120 Although this section has been held not to specif-
ically cover manufacturers or suppliers so as to subject them to
negligence per se by violating a statute,' it clearly articulates that
safety in the work place is a recognized public policy of
Pennsylvania.
In addition, the Geary court could have used certain sections of
the Pennsylvania Constitution to support the recognition of a
cause of action for wrongful discharge when the discharge resulted
from the employee's reporting of a life threatening flaw in his em-
ployer's product. In article 1, section 2, the Pennsylvania Constitu-
tion provides that "[a]ll power is inherent in the people, and all
free governments are founded on their authority and instituted for
their peace, safety and happiness .... ."12 This section clearly in-
dicates that one of the greatest concerns of the state of Pennsylva-
nia, and of all governments no doubt, is the safety of its people.
The above section, when viewed with article 1, section 11, which
provides that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every man for an in-
jury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation shall have
remedy by due course of law . .. .,128 would have supported, in
Geary, the adoption of a broad public policy exception to the at-
will rule in order that the policy of public safety, inherent in our
constitution, should not be frustrated.
Notwithstanding the above, by referring to cases which permit-
ted a cause of action based on statute and/or state constitution,
the Geary court incorrectly concluded that the fount of public pol-
icy is limited to these two sources. It overlooked the most obvious
source of public policy considerations, the public policy expressed
119. 43 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. §§ 25-1 to -15 (Purdon Supp. 1982). This act was in effect
prior to the Geary incident and remains the viable law of Pennsylvania.
120. Id.
121. Heichel v. Lima-Hamilton Corp., 98 F. Supp. 232 (N.D. Ohio 1951) (applying
Pennsylvania law). See, e.g., PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, §§ 611-615 (Purdon Supp. 1982-1983)
(safety provisions relating to building regulations); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 52, §§ 70-223 to -232
(Purdon 1966) (safety provisions relating to anthracite coal mines).
122. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 2.
123. PA. CONST. art. 1, § 11.
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by the common law of Pennsylvania.1 2' The dissent in Geary did
not suffer from such tunnel-vision. Justice Roberts quickly noted
that Pennsylvania decisions have clearly expressed that public
safety is a major concern of Pennsylvania courts.' 5 Pennsylvania
courts have granted relief to those injured by defective merchan-
dise, albeit consumer or commercial in nature.2 0 Why not, then,
view the prevention of injury as a fundamental and desirable ob-
jective of Pennsylvnia and acknowledge it as a "recognized facet of
public policy" promoted by the common law. It is upon this basis
that the courts should grant a cause of action for wrongful dis-
charge if the discharge is an employer's retaliation against an em-
ployee who found a dangerous flaw in its product."'
As noted before, although the Geary court denied relief to
Geary, it did acknowledge Pennsylvania's willingness to recognize a
cause of action for wrongful discharge where a clear and compel-
ling mandate of public policy was violated. In Reuther v. Fowler &
Williams, Inc.,1"5 this dictum from Geary was used by the Superior
Court of Pennsylvania to grant a cause of action to an employee
who had been discharged for serving on jury duty. "In our view,
the necessity of having citizens freely available for jury service is
just the sort of 'recognized facet of public policy' alluded to by our
Supreme Court in Geary . "... M29 In Reuther, Judge Spaeth rec-
ognized that there were two plausible reasons for the plaintiff's
dismissal. One reason cited was the plaintiff served on jury duty
against the wishes of his employer, who had advised the plaintiff of
ways to evade jury service. The other plausible reason was that the
plaintiff had failed to notify his employer that he was serving and
would be absent for one week.180 In view of these two contradictory
reasons, the court found that it was within the province of the jury
to decide which one was the true reason for Reuther's dismissal
and thus vacated the lower court's compulsory non-suit and re-
124. In Commonwealth v. McCreary, 343 Pa. 355, 22 A.2d 686 (1941), the Pennsylva-
nia Supreme Court held:
The power of the court to determine what is against public policy, in a proper case, is
well recognized .... [Wihen a given policy is so obviously for or against the public
health, safety, morals, or welfare [and] there is a virtual unanimity of opinion in re-
gard to it . ..a court may constitute itself the voice of the community ....
Id. at 360, 22 A.2d at 689 (citations omitted).
125. 456 Pa. at 187, 319 A.2d at 181 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 187, 319 A.2d at 184 (Roberts, J., dissenting).
128. 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978).





Both Geary and Reuther were used by the Third Circuit in
Perks v. Firestone Tire and Rubber Co.' to grant a cause of ac-
tion to an at-will employee who claimed he was discharged because
he refused to submit to a polygraph test. The court found that the
Pennsylvania statute forbidding employers from requiring poly-
graph tests' as a condition for employment, or continuation of
employment, embodies a "recognized facet of public policy" of the
type proscribed by the Pennsylvania courts in Geary and
Reuther.'
3 4
As in Reuther, two plausible reasons existed for plaintiff Perk's
discharge. The first, as previously discussed, was Perk's refusal to
submit to a polygraph test. The second, as Firestone contended,
was based on the plaintiffs acceptance of gratuities from a repre-
sentative of a supplier in violation of corporate policy. Firestone
argued Geary's rationale that, "even when an important public
policy is involved, 'an employer may discharge an employee if he
has a separate, plausible, and legitimate reason for doing so.',M
However, the court concluded that when genuine issues of material
fact exist, it is the province of the jury to decide the controversy. 3 '
In 1979, John J. McNulty brought a three count cause of action
against Borden, Inc.,13 7 alleging anti-trust violations, breach of con-
tract, and defamation.'38 McNulty, a former unit manager for Bor-
den, claimed that during the course of his employment for Borden
he became aware that a Mr. Matthews, Borden's district manager,
either personally or through other unit managers, offered special
131. Id. at 34, 386 A.2d at 122. Cf. 456 Pa. at 184-85, 319 A.2d at 180. The majority in
Geary specifically said where a "plausible and legitimte reason" exists for terminating an at-
will employee and "no clear mandate of public policy is violated thereby, an employee at
will has no right of action against his employer for wrongful discharge." Id. (emphasis
added). The "and" in the majority's holding has been used by Pennsylvania courts and
federal courts sitting in Pennsylvania to allow the factual question to go to the jury. See
Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 386 A.2d 119 (1978); Perks v. Fire-
stone Tire and Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
132. 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979).
133. 18 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 7321(a) (Purdon 1973) provides: "A person is guilty of a
misdemeanor of the second degree if he requires as a condition for employment or continua-
tion of employment that an employe or other individual shall take a polygraph test or any
form of a mechanical or electrical lie detector test." Id.
134. 611 F.2d at 1366.
135. Id. (quoting Reuther v. Fowler & Williams, Inc., 255 Pa. Super. 28, 34, 386 A.2d
119, 122 (1978)).
136. Id. See supra note 126 and accompanying text.
137. McNulty v. Borden, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 1111 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
138. Id. at 1114.
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pricing arrangements to certain customers but not to others. When
the plaintiff refused to take part in the granting of these special
pricing arrangements he came into severe conflict with Matthews,
who then compiled a file allegedly filled with false accusations and
reports, to justify the plaintiff's dismissal. e13  McNulty claimed his
dismissal was an effort to prevent discovery of the special pricing
arrangements, that his termination was wrongful and was not in
conformity with established company policy," 0 and that the defen-
dant knowingly furnished the contents of the falsified reports to
prospective employers.""
Defendant Borden filed a motion to dismiss all three counts of
plaintiff McNulty's complaint claiming as follows: (1) plaintiff did
not have standing to sue under the Clayton Act for anti-trust vio-
lations,' 42 (2) plaintiff was an employee-at-will and therefore ter-
minable at will without cause, with or without notice,"' and (3)
defendant's communications to prospective employers were privi-
leged and therefore could not support a cause of action for defama-
tion.' 4 The trial court denied defendant's motion as to all three
139. Id.
140. The McNulty court noted that the defendant's failure to adhere to certain com-
pany guidelines in discharging the plaintiff did not constitute a breach of his employment
contract. Id. at 1119 n.3. But see DeFrank v. County of Greene, 50 Pa. Commw. 30, 412 A.2d
663 (1980). In DeFrank, the court found a contract by estoppel based on an employment
manual which provided for certain termination procedures which were not followed in
DeFrank's termination. However, Pennsylvania law is scant in this area and it is unclear
whether written termination procedures by private employers will be enforceable in a court
of law or whether such written procedures are enforceable only against governmental bodies,
as in DeFrank. Some courts have specifically adopted the "contract by estoppel" theory as
applicable against private employers when a written personnel manual provided for termi-
nation "for cause" or only after certain procedures were followed. See, e.g., Cleary v. Ameri-
can Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443, 168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980) (company bound by ex-
pressed procedures for adjudicating employee's rights); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Mich., 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980) (employers cannot defeat legitimate
expectations by arbitrarily departing from written policies); Weiner v.RMcGraw-Hill, Inc.,
N.Y. Ct. App., No. 485, (Nov. 18, 1982) (personnel handbooks which provided for termina-
tion only for "just and sufficient cause" created an enforceable contract). Since Pennsylva-
nia treats the at-will rule as a rebuttable presumption, see Cummings v. Kelling Nut Co.,
368 Pa. 448, 84 A.2d 323 (1951), personnel manuals, as well as oral representations, should
be admissible as evidence to refute the at-will status of an employee if they provide for
terminations only "for cause." The McNulty court did not completely foreclose the plain-
tifts attempt to remove his contract from the operation of the employment-at-will rule,
however, for it acknowledged Pennsylvania's recognition of the doctrine of additional con-
sideration. 474 F. Supp. at 1119.
141. 474 F. Supp. at 1114.
142. Id. at 1115.
143. Id. at 1118.
144. Id. at 1120 n.5.
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counts and the denial was sustained upon a motion for
reconsideration.
4 5
In sustaining McNulty's cause of action for wrongful discharge,
the court read Geary146 as allowing a cause of action for wrongful
termination if either specific intent to cause harm to the employee
can be shown 47 or a clear mandate of public policy is violated by
the discharge.1 48 The court used the specific intent averred in Mc-
Nulty's claim for defamation to supply the requisite intent to sus-
tain a cause of action for wrongful discharge.1 '" Additionally, the
court found that McNulty had been discharged because he refused
to commit a crime and that his discharge was an act in furtherance
of the illegal pricing scheme. 150 Thus, the court held that a clear
mandate of public policy had been violated by his termination. 1' 5
As such, the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss and
scheduled the case for trial.'
5
2
In 1980, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania was faced with a
case similar to that of Geary. In Yaindl v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 55
the plaintiff claimed he was discharged for reporting a defective
product to his employer. The facts of Yaindl do not appear to sup-
port as strongly a cause of action for wrongful discharge as did
145. Id. at 1120-22. Although Count I did not deal with terminating employees-at-will,
it did raise an interesting topic for future challenges to the at-will rule. In finding that
McNulty had standing under the Clayton Act, which requires a plaintiff to have sustained
injuries to his business or property, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1976), the court held that "an employee
who suffers the loss of his job has been injured in his property." 474 F. Supp. at 1116. This
could possibly open the door to a future constitutional challenge of the at-will rule based on
denial of due process and/or equal protection. Professor Cornelius J. Peck of the University
of Washington School of Law has discussed the possibility of a due process and/or equal
protection challenge to the at-will rule. His argument is based on federal and state interven-
tion to protect certain classes of employees from arbitrary dismissal while ignoring or sanc-
tioning by silence the arbitrary dismissals of at-will employees. See Peck, supra note 5, at
34-42 (equal protection) and 46-49 (due process).
In addition, it should be noted that causes of action for defamation, as in McNulty,
have been utilized by at-will employees to supply "backdoor" relief in a limited number of
cases for wrongful termination. See, eg., Berg v. Consolidated Freightways, 280 Pa. Super.
495, 421 A.2d 831 (1980) (employee had been forced to resign during theft investigation
along with actual thieves and the employer, either willfully or in reckless disregard of the
truth, communicated the employee's involvement to third persons although such accusations
were false).
146. See supra notes 111-30 and accompanying text.





152. Id. at 1113.
153. 281 Pa. Super. 560, 422 A.2d 611 (1980).
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those in Geary, but a close review shows that Yaindl also deserved
his day in court. Three months had passed between Yaindl's report
and his discharge. As in Geary, Yaindl's report was heeded and his
employer began to look for ways to repair and/or replace the defec-
tive product. For three months after reporting the defect, Yaindl
minced no words in expressing his beliefs as to the cause of the
defect. These beliefs were expressed to upper-management and es-
pecially to Mr. Burns, the person whom Yaindl felt was responsible
for placing the defective item on the market. Although manage-
ment was aware of the animosity which grew between Yaindl and
Burns, as a result of Yaindl's report and expressed beliefs, Yaindl,
originally a field representative, was reassigned to work under
Burns in the manufacturing department. Repeated, heated argu-
ments between Yaindl and his new supervisor ensued. These argu-
ments necessitated numerous mediation efforts from upper-man-
agement.15" The final battle between Yaindl and his new supervisor
was a "your're fired," "I quit" situation. 15 5 After Yaindl's dis-
charge, a group manager of Ingersoll-Rand, at Yaindl's request,
conducted an investigation and found that Burns terminated him
due to insubordination. 15 The court concluded that even if the
public policy exception extended to public safety considerations,
the true reason for Yaindl's discharge was to rid the defendant of a
"disruptive employee" and that reasonable minds could not differ




By reaching such a conclusion, it appears that Judge Spaeth
placed too little emphasis upon the facts that Yaindl was fired by
the man who he felt was responsible for marketing the defective
product and that the only reason Yaindl was able to be fired by
him was due to what may not have been a fortuitous reassignment.
Although the defendant claimed that Yaindl was reassigned out of
business necessity,15 8 it is also possible that the defendant, able to
predict with reasonable certainty the result of such an assignment,
deliberately placed Yaindl in a potentially "disruptive" environ-
154. Id. at 566-68, 442 A.2d at 614-16. Yaindl's criticism of the product antagonized
Burns. Approximately six weeks after Yaindl's report, Burns, who had previously been
friendly to Yaindl, asked him into his office and cursed him for writing his report and send-
ing it to all the department heads. During the meeting, Yaindl accused Burns of falsifying
the inspection reports. Upper management entered to mediate between them. Subsequent
meetings between Burns and Yaindl also required mediation by upper management. Id.
155. Id. at 567, 422 A.2d at "614-15.
156. Id. at 567-68, 422 A.2d at 616.
157. Id. at 578-80, 422 A.2d at 620-21.
158. Id. at 566-67, 422 A.2d at 614.
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ment and patiently waited for the result.159 Another possibility is
that Burns, upon learning that Yaindl was going to be assigned to
him, made his own plans on how to rid himself of a constant re-
minder that he had been accused of falsifying test results. But,
even if Burns' actions had such a personal motive,160 the fact that
his act was later sanctioned by the defendant-employer returns the
liability for discharge to the defendant.'' Thus, despite Judge
Spaeth's conviction that reasonable minds could not differ as to
the reason for Yaindl's dismissal, the facts of the case present two
plausible causes for Yaindl's discharge, one legitimate, the other
not. Yaindl should have been reversed and remanded to allow a
jury to decide the disputed issues of fact.
B. The Proposed Legislation
Today, the law in Pennsylvania in regard to at-will employees
remains relatively unchanged. The reluctance of the supreme court
to delineate what it considers to be a "recognized facet of public
policy" has left advocates and employees in a situation virtually
identical to one they found themselves in one hundred years ago.
In an apparent response to the Geary decision and those which
followed suit by narrowly construing the public policy exception,
State Representative James Manderino submitted a bill to the
Pennsylvania House of Representatives on July 1, 1981, House Bill
159. See supra note 137. The defendant knew that Yaindl's report antagonized Burns,
and responded by removing Yaindl from the project. During the period in which these
events occurred, the decision to transfer Yaindl to work under Burns was made. 281 Pa.
Super. at 566-67, 422 A.2d at 614-15. It seems too coincidental that of all the field represent-
atives who worked for defendant, Yaindl was the one chosen to work under Burns. The fact
that the reassignment of Yaindl to work under Burns, a man with whom the plaintiff clearly
could not work, was made by the defendant with the knowledge of their animosity, is cer-
tainly a point of consideration which a jury would weigh in determining the true motivation
behind Yaindl's transfer and subsequent discharge.
160. When an employee acts solely for his own personal benefit in discharging another
employee, the employer is not liable. See Campbell v. Ford Indus., 274 Or. 243, 252-58, 546
P.2d 141, 147-50 (1976). See generally Howard v. Zaney Bar, 369 Pa. 155, 85 A.2d 401
(1952) (an employer is not presumed liable for every act of an employee even though the act
is a means of accomplishing an authorized result; the act may be deemed so outrageous and/
or privately motivated that it is outside the scope of employment).
161. An agent of the defendant conducted an investigation of the plaintiff's dismissal.
After this investigation, the company advised the plaintiff that his dismissal was deemed
proper. 281 Pa. Super. at 570, 422 A.2d at 616. The company, therefore, adopted or ratified
the actions of Burns. See, e.g., Evans v. Ruth, 129 Pa. Super. 192, 195 A. 163 (1937) (ratific-
tion is the affirmance by a person of a prior act which did not bind him but which was done
or professedly done on his account, whereby the act is given effect as if originally authorized
by him).
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1742, to protect employees against unjust dismissal. 162 House Bill
1742 was a broad, all encompassing attempt to resolve the dilemma
of the employee-at-will by requiring all employers to terminate
only for "just cause."163 However, this bill suffered the fate of most
bills proposed by a minority representative when there is no lobby
to fight for its passage; it died in committee.
House Bill 1742 would have caused a change more drastic than
any which could be conceived under the general public policy ex-
ception. It mandated written notice to an employee, within fifteen
days after termination, setting forth all the reasons for dis-
charge.1 6 The employee would have thirty days in which to file a
complaint with the labor bureau from the date of receipt of notice
or within thirty days after the initial fifteen day notice waiting pe-
riod, Whichever occurred first."65 Upon receipt of the complaint by
the bureau, a mediator would be appointed to assist the employee
and employer in resolving the dispute."6 If the dispute was not
resolved within thirty days after the commencement of the media-
tion procedure, the employee could request an extended period of
mediation if he or she thought a peaceful resolution could be had.
If not, then the employee could request the bureau to arrange for a
hearing of binding arbitration to resolve the matter. 167 If binding
arbitration were requested, a hearing date would be set within
sixty days from the date of the appointment of the arbitrator. The
arbitrator would then have thirty days in which to render a deci-
sion and an opinion. 168
The remedies under House Bill 1742 included, but were not lim-
ited to, sustaining the discharge, reinstating the employee with no,
partial, or full back pay, and severance pay.169 House Bill 1742 also
provided for limited judicial review to determine questions of juris-
diction and whether or not the award was the result of fraud, collu-
sion or other similar unlawful means.170 Further, the employee
could have petitioned the court to order the award paid if the em-
ployer refused to comply with the arbitrator's decision. It also pro-
vided that an employer who refused to comply with the court en-
162. H.B. 1742, 165th Pa. Gen. Assem., (1981 Sess.)
163. Id. § 3(a).
164. Id. § 3(b).
165. Id. § 4(a), (b).
166. Id. § 5(a).
167. Id. §§ 5(b), 6(a).
168. Id. §§ 6(b), 7(a).
169. Id. § 7(b)(1)-(3).
170. Id. § 9.
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forcement order was subject to contempt charges and could have
been fined in an amount not to exceed two-hundred fifty dollars
per day. 7'
Interestingly, the bill specifically excluded from the definition of
employees those employees who were protected by a collective bar-
gaining agreement, civil service employees, and those persons hav-
ing a written employment contract for two years or more.'7 2 It fur-
ther provided that the proposed act would not supersede an
employer's grievance procedure if that procedure provided for an
impartial, final and binding arbitration of discharge-related griev-
ances and the procedure met the standards of the bill.'"
However, five shortcomings appeared on the face of the bill.
First, it did not define "just cause." Second, it did not indicate who
should bear the costs of the mediator and/or arbitrator. Third, it
appeared to place the burden of proof upon the employer. Fourth,
it did not distinguish as to employer size. Fifth, it did not exclude
actions against employers for which the employee already had an
adequate statutory remedy at law, such as racial, sex or age dis-
crimination. Thus, under House Bill 1742 the employer may have
been forced into a vulnerable position, one which he would not
have experienced under the general public policy exception. Since
House Bill 1742 died in committee, Representative Manderino
could make a few revisions prior to resubmission. These revisions
would make House Bill 1742 a more effective piece of legislation
from which both the employer and employee could determine their
stance.
For example, "just cause" could be defined in a manner similar
to the now defunct United States House Bill 7010,'" with a few
pertinent changes, as follows: "Just cause" shall be defined in ac-
cordance with the common law of labor contracts established pur-
suant to section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, except
that "just cause" shall not include (A) the exercise of a constitu-
tional, civil, or legal right; (B) the refusal to engage in or acquiesce
in unlawful conduct as a condition of employment; (C) the refusal
to submit to polygraph or other similar tests; (D) the refusal to
submit to a search of one's person or property, other than routine
inspections, conducted by an employer without legal process; (E)
refusal to commit or acquiesce in acts which detrimentally affect
171. Id. § 10.
172. Id. § 2.
173. Id. § 11.
174. See supra note 54.
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the health, safety and welfare of the general public." In addition,
some affirmative examples of "just cause" could be given, such as
repeated, unexcused tardiness or absences; insubordination; pro-
curement of job by fraud or deceit; intoxication on the job; behav-
ior, both on and off the job, which adversely reflects on the em-
ployer's business reputation; gross incompetence; unreasonable
refusal to perform an assigned task; exposing the employer to
criminal and/or civil liability; and economic business necessity.
With "just cause" thus defined, both the employer and employee
will be on sufficient notice as to whether their behavior is pro-
tected by the statute.
The act should provide that the costs should follow the verdict
and add a punitive provision authorizing allowance of attorney's
fees if the losing party's conduct is found to be outrageous. This
would make employees think twice about filing a frivolous com-
plaint and cause the employer to make certain of his reasons
before terminating an employee. Additionally, the burden of proof
should clearly be on the employee not the employer. The employee
would have to show that his or her dismissal was without cause as
defined by the act and would have to proffer and support the rea-
son or reasons he or she believes was the. true cause for dismissal.
The employer would then be given an opportunity to rebut the
employee's allegations. Without this safeguard, the employer
would be presumed guilty before being proved innocent."'
Further, the act should not be applicable to all employers. Small
businesses, those with five or less employees unrelated to the own-
er, should be exempt. This limitation could be likened to the ex-
ception provided for in the Federal Civil Rights Act of 1964,176
where the "small" landlord is specifically excluded from its provi-
sions.17 7 Finally, the act should specifically exclude actions against
175. Although worker's compensation laws impose liability without fault, there is no
compelling reason to do so in wrongful discharge cases. Thus, the employee should bear the
burden of proof as he or she would have done had the case been brought in a court of law.
176. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (1976 and Supp. III 1979).
177. The Civil Rights Act makes unlawful discrimination "because of race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin," 42 U.S.C. § 3604(a), in the sale or rental of housing that is
"owned or operated by the Federal Government," or financed or supported by various gov-
ernment programs, id. § 3603(a)(1)(A), (C). The act is also applicable to all other dwellings,
except "any single family house" when its owner then "does not own" nor have "any inter-
est in ...more than three such ..." and the private owner does not use a real estate
broker, or advertising that states a discriminatory preference, id. § 3603(b)(i). Section
3603(b)(2) further exempts "rooms or units in dwellings containing living quarters occupied
or intended to be occupied by no more than four families living independently of each other,
if the owner actually maintains and occupies one of such living quarters as his residence."
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employers for which there is already an adequate statutory remedy
such as racial, sex or age discrimination. This is necessary to limit
the arbitrator's case load and to ensure that such questions are
handled by those agencies with specific subject matter expertise
who have the means to investigate fully the accusations which are
made.
It must be noted, however, that even in its original form, House
Bill 1742 would have been a workable reform act which would have
provided needed relief to at-will employees in Pennsylvania. Al-
though it lacked certain details, mediators and arbitrators would
have had a wealth of decisions from which to draw the definition of
"just cause.' 1 78 In view of this, it is possible that Representative
Manderino's decision not to include a definition of "just cause"
was deliberate, not accidental. 179 Further, while the other proposed
modifications would have made the bill more palatable to employ-
ers, their absence was not fatal. However, since House Bill 1742
died in committee, and the prospect of its resubmission is unlikely
in view of the lack of organized support,180 the burden ricochets
back to the courts.
V. CONCLUSION
In Geary, the majority discussed the problems it experienced in
Id.
178. See, e.g., Lowenstein v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 319 F. Supp.
1096 (D. Mass. 1970) (employee inefficiency is just cause for dismissal); Texas Employment
Comm'n v. Ryan, 481 S.W.2d 172 (Tex. Civ. App. 1976) (employee dishonesty is just cause
for dismissal). For a more complete overview of the wide scope of activities found to be just
cause for dismissal, see the topical index to LAB. L. REP. (CCH) at 13,271-73.
179. St. Antoine, You're Fired!, 10 HUM. RTS. 32 (Winter 1982). Mr. St. Antoine be-
lieves that, if the at-will rule is eliminated by a statute requiring the just cause standard,
"just cause" should not be defined. He stated that is it possible that the definition would
suffer from underinclusiveness and that experienced arbitrators or other tribunals of law
which will hear the case are more than qualified in interpreting and recognizing "just
cause." Id. at 36-37, 53.
On June 22, 1982, the International Labor Organization, in an attempt to alleviate the
harshness of the at-will termination doctrine through a statutory scheme, ratified a Conven-
tion on Termination of Employment. The Convention, which is a binding rule on those
countries which ratified it, provides in pertinent part: "The employment of a worker shall
not be terminated unless there is a valid reason for such termination connected with the
capacity or conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of the undertak-
ing, establishment or service." INTERNATIONAL LABOR CONFERENCE 1982, Convention on Ter-
mination of Employment, Art. 4. The full text of this Convention can be found in The
Employment-at-Will Issue, LAB. REL. RE. (BNA Spec. Report) at 72 (Nov. 22, 1982). Per-
haps such a statement-like definition of "good cause" would be best. This would leave arbi-
trators free to weigh the facts on a case by case basis.
180. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
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dealing with a cause of action for wrongful discharge. Two of the
reasons for the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's caution are not new
to the judicial arena. The court was first concerned that the grant-
ing of a cause of action for wrongful discharge would create a
"heavy burden on our judicial system."181 The court's second con-
cern was that "thorny problems of proof would be presented."
18 2
Acknowledging that these alone were insufficient to deny a cause of
action, the Geary court asserted that its greatest concern was the
"possible impact of such suits on the legitimate interests of em-
ployers in hiring and retaining the best personnel available." '
Admittedly, the primary concern of any court that considers a
cause of action for wrongful discharge should be developing a rule
which affords the at-will employee a certain stability of employ-
ment but which does not interfere with the employer's normal ex-
ercise of his right to discharge."8 The question thus becomes which
standard will do the most justice without unduly restricting the
employer's normal exercise of its right to terminate.
Of the three exceptions presently considered by the courts, the
good faith standard appears to offer the most job security to the
at-will employee. 8 5 However, it may be more susceptible to abuse
by disgruntled employees,186 and thus place an unreasonable
financial burden on the employer.18 7 Further, it is possible that the
181. 456 Pa. at 181, 319 A.2d at 179.
182. Id.
183. Id.
184. See, e.g., Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974).
185. The courts have not considered implementing the "good cause" standard which
would be the epitome of job security for the at-will employee. The closest any court has
come to adopting this standard was Cleary v. American Airlines, Inc., 111 Cal. App. 3d 443,
168 Cal. Rptr. 722 (1980). In Cleary, the California Court of Appeal described the "good
faith" standard as one which varies according to the circumstances of employment. The
Cleary court said that an employer's subjective dissatisfaction with a long-term employee's
performance would not be a sufficient reason for termination under the "good faith" test. Id.
at 449, 168 Cal. Rptr. at 729-30. This implies that the longer a person is employed, the
closer the "good faith" standard approaches "good cause." However, this would not affect
the termination of a short-term employee who had been discharged in good faith without
cause. Thus, the "good faith" standard affords less protection to the at-will employee than
the "good cause" standard.
186. See Note, supra note 73, at 224.
187. Obviously, the costs of defending a wrongful discharge matter becomes a part of
the employer's cost of doing business. To recoup the cost of doing business, employers may
elect a lower profit margin, pass the increases along to the consumer of their goods or ser-
vices, or offer lower salaries to their employees. Although a reasonable amount may be ab-
sorbed by a combination of these three items, excessive amounts cannot. If the cost of this
protection is too unreasonable, an employer can find himself in a position where he cannot
afford the quality of employees he needs to run his business efficiently, or he is unable to
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"good faith" standard would translate into "good cause" in the
minds of the jury188 as well as in the minds of the judiciary."",
Since the good faith standard implies an action for breach of con-
tract, it is possible that an employer would be called upon to de-
fend a cause of action for wrongful discharge up to six years after
the discharge has occurred.190 Thus, if the good faith standard is to
be imposed upon the employer, it may be best left to the legisla-
ture who has the wherewithal to provide for economical adminis-
trative tribunals, as well as provide guidelines and statutes of limi-
tations more amenable to such causes of actions.' 9'
Notwithstanding the fact that some courts, including those in
Pennsylvania, have relied upon the strict public policy exception
based on explicit statutory or constitutional provisions,'92 such an
exception renders very little security to the at-will employee; As
shown in the above discussion of Geary,193 there were statutes
upon which a cause of action could have been based. Nevertheless,
Geary found himself out of court and out of a job without re-
course. 94 Geary was not the only wrongfully discharged employee
who suffered from the application of the strict public policy exep-
tion. The Hinrichs plaintiff, who refused to falsify hospital
records, 19 5 and the Ivy plaintiff, who refused to commit perjury at
offer his product or services at a competitive price, and must therefore cease doing business.
Thus, although protection is needed by the at-will employee, it cannot be given without
considering the consequences. The good faith standard would undoubtedly support more
causes of action than either the strict public policy exception or the general public policy
exception by its mere nature. Although it has been utilized in the labor field before, gener-
ally it has been applied by administrative tribunals specifically created by statute or by
private arbitration associations at a fraction of the cost of a full fledged court case.
188. See Blades, supra note 5, at 1431.
189. Estreicher, At- Will Employment and the Problem of Unjust Dismissal: The Ap-
propriate Judicial Response, 54 N.Y. ST. B.J. 146, 172 (1982).
190. Pennsylvania has a six year statute of limitations for all assumpsit actions not
controlled by the Uniform Commercial Code. 42 PA. CON. STAT. ANN. § 5527 (Purdon 1981).
This period seems unreasonably long to apply to contract actions based on a breach of an
employment at-will. Generally when an action for breach of contract is brought, there is a
written expression of the intention of the parties. Since there is no written contract in at-
will situations, a shorter statute of limitations seems needed to ensure that memories and
witnesses have not faded over the lapse of time.
191. See H.B. 1742, supra notes 162-73 and accompanying text. House Bill 1742
placed a 45 day maximum statute of limitations on the bringing of a wrongful discharge
action. Although this is short, it is not unreasonable in view of the fact that an employee
should know on the date of discharge whether he feels his discharge was made in bad faith.
192. See supra notes 74-92 and accompanying text.
193. See supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text.
194. Id.
195. See supra notes 101-02 and accompanying text.
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his employer's behest,196 also found themselves without recourse
from terminations which clearly violated general public policy.
19 7
Thus, the strict public policy exception appears to be as disadvan-
tageous to the employee as the good faith standard would be to the
employer. Since it is the proper balancing of an employee's interest
in maintaining his job and the employer's interest in exercising his
normal right of termination which is sought in wrongful discharge
matters, both the good faith and strict public policy exceptions
must be discarded as inadequate.
The general public policy exception seems to be the best suited
for satisfying both the needs of the employer as well as the needs
of the employee. General public policy, that underlying current in
statutory, constitutional, and common law, can be easily recog-
nized. It is with us in our everyday lives and is basically anything
which concerns the health, safety and welfare of the citizens of a
state. 9 ' Courts which have employed the general public policy ex-
ception have recognized causes of actions for employees who were
terminated for cooperating with law enforcement officials,1 99 for
seeking to have their employer comply with state banking laws,200
and who refused to participate in an alleged price fixing scheme.20
We are living in an age of apathy where American employees
have been accused of not caring about the quality of their work.
196. See supra note 76.
197. Under the strict public policy exception, the plaintiffs in Harless and Palmateer
would have found themselves without recourse because there was no statute which specifi-
cally protected "citizen crime fighters" or "citizen consumer protectors." Fortunately, the
Harless and Palmateer courts employed the general public policy exception and granted a
cause of action for employees whose actions were clearly designed to inure a benefit to soci-
ety as a whole. See supra notes 93-96 and accompanying text. Additionally, it is not known
whether Geary's public policy exception will extend to terminations made in retaliation for
filing a worker's compensation claim. Pennsylvania Worker's Compensation Statute, PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 77, §§ 1-1603 (Purdon 1952 and Supp. 1982-1983), does not provide an ex-
press remedy against such retaliation and no case on this issue has been reported from any
of the Pennsylvania courts as yet.
198. When addressing the issue of what constitutes public policy, the Illinois Supreme
Court, in Palmateer v. International Harvester Co., 85 IlI. 2d 124, 421 N.E.2d 876 (1981),
stated:
There is no precise definition of the term. In general, it can be said that public policy
concerns what is right and just and what affects the citizens of the state collectively.
It is to be found in the state's constitution and statutes and, when they are silent, in
its judicial decisions.
Id. at 131, 421 N.E.2d at 878.
199. Id.
200. Harless v. First Nat'l Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W. Va. 1978).
201. Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal. 3d 167, 610 P.2d 1330, 164 Cal. Rptr.
839 (1980).
Employment-at-Will
Given the strict enforcement of the at-will rule in the past, it is
possible that American employees have been lulled into this com-
placence from fear for their job. Even if they know there is a defect
in the product which they are making or selling, history has proven
that it is best to keep quiet and follow instructions. 2  If a general
public policy exception to the at-will rule were recognized, benefits
would flow to both employer and employee alike. It would promote
and maintain good personnel relations and thus result in fewer
turnovers in staff. Fewer turnovers would result in less time and
money spent on training and more time spent productively. A gen-
eral public policy exception will give employees some sense of sta-
bility in their job and encourage the employee to bring defects to
their employer's attention. This will inure a benefit to the safety of
the consuming public. In addition, a general public policy excep-
tion will prevent employees from being economically coerced into
refraining from reporting to law enforcement officials illegal con-
duct on the part of fellow employees or their employer. Again, this
will benefit the public at large which has an interest in bringing
criminals to justice.03
This commentator supports the recognition of a cause of action
for wrongful discharge based on general public policy considera-
tions which are reflected in every day life and the common law, as
well as those espoused by statute and the constitution. Generally,
any conduct of an employer which offends or infringes upon the
policies of a state regarding public health, safety and welfare
should be actionable. The employer is already familiar with the va-
rious "whistle-blowing" statutes of both federal and state govern-
ment. The public policy exeption would be comparable to a "whis-
tle-blowing" provision implied by law. Further, the employer
would have the opportunity to rebut an employee's charge by prov-
ing a separate, plausible, legitimate reason for the discharge. The
factual question would be one for the jury, however.
By granting a cause of action for wrongful discharge based on
these grounds, the courts would not guarantee an employee the
right to unfettered behavior in the work place. It would simply
provide a means of redress when his employer's actions were un-
202. Geary v. United States Steel Corp., 456 Pa. 171, 319 A.2d 174 (1974).
203. In Howard v. Dorr Woolen Co., 120 N.H. 295, 414 A.2d 1273 (1980), the New
Hampshire Supreme Court described when the public policy exception is applicable. It
should be applied "to a situation where an employee is discharged because he performed an
act that public policy would encourage, or refused to do that which public policy would
condemn." Id. at 297, 414 A.2d at 1274.
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conscionable in view of the public policy of this state. When such
obvious abuses exist, it is the duty of the courts, the creators of the
at-will rule, to provide protection against such abuses to those em-
ployees harmed.
Dolores Jacobs Krawec
